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pAbstract
In the 1970s and early 1980s, several maritime anthropologists and sociologists
pointed out that for a number of economic, social and psychological reasons, the
performance of commercial fishing firms based on kin-based capital and labour was
highly adaptive. For this reason, most crews in the North Atlantic area seemed to
be organized around a core of agnatic relatives with women playing important
shore-based roles. As of the early 1990s, the attention of anthropologists and
sociologists shifted away from ‘classical’ themes such as the social organization of
fishing to issues of policy and management, particularly property rights regimes and
rights-based fishing. Consequently, the topic of kin and family in the fisheries
disappeared into the background. Nonetheless, it would appear that family firms are
still predominant in the fisheries. In this paper, I will analyze their logic and dynamic
in conditions of ecological, economic and political uncertainty, using ethnographic
material from research in Dutch fishing communities on the island of Texel.
Considerable attention will be devoted to the issue of what rights-based management
regimes have meant for the social organization of and kin involvement in fishing firms.
Keywords: Family firms; Occupational inheritance; Agnatic capital; NetherlandsIntroduction
Throughout Europe, the fishing industry is in serious decline. This situation is often
blamed on the proverbial greed of fisher folk: had it not been for the European Union’s
measures, the seas would have already been depleted some time ago. Adding insult to
injury, fishermen are thus stereotyped as victims of their own rapacious behaviour.
This image has turned into a conviction. However, Europe’s post-war governments
contributed to exacerbating the problem of overfishing. They urged vessel owners to
expand and modernize and heavily subsidized their national fishing industries. When
by the mid-1970s the devastating consequences became apparent to politicians and
policymakers, the European supranational entity began attempting to harness the
industry. This development generated its own tragic stories, with non-propertied crew-
members usually paying a particularly heavy price. New management regimes also se-
verely affected owner-operators, but they often attempted to hold on to their occupation
against all economic odds, especially if they were running a family firm.
In many cases, family firms have proven to be exceptionally versatile and resilient.
Kinship plays a prominent role in the European fishing industry’s social organization,
particularly where fishing is a form of petty or domestic commodity production2014 van Ginkel; licensee Springer This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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ciologists pointed out that for a number of economic, social and psychological reasons,
the performance of commercial fishing firms based on familial capital and labour was
highly adaptive. Many of these reasons continue to be highly significant. Agnatic kin
(father-son(s), paternal uncle-nephew(s) or brothers) - are strongly interdependent and
have to stick together to continue fishing because a vessel constitutes an undividable
asset (Löfgren 1972; Norr and Norr 1978). More importantly, a family firm is a com-
mon pool of resources. Relatives share forces of production, labour, capital, knowledge
and expertise. In so doing, they spread risks and reduce vulnerabilities. The earnings
remain within a narrowly defined core of kinsfolk, enabling the quick accumulation of
capital in good seasons. All participating family members ultimately benefit. Therefore,
the family firm is a system of self-motivated labour (Thompson et al. 1983:156). Con-
versely, in bad times owners tend to work longer hours and/or cut back on their expen-
ditures. They often defer their income from the ship’s share and, if they work aboard
ship, take a smaller part of the crew share. They will reduce profit margins, postpone
reinvestments in equipment and, if necessary, even eat into their own savings. Generat-
ing profits is not their only objective. Thus, the family firm is also a form of self-
exploitation (Jorion 1983:10). Moreover, close social ties are believed to enhance team-
work aboard a fishing boat and ‘the model of a family partnership makes possible the
conversion of the kinship values of trust, solidarity, the equivalence of siblings and mu-
tual aid on the private level into the organizational norms of voluntary cooperation,
equality and mutual reliance on the team level’ (Byron 1975:155).
However, by the early 1990s the anthropologists’ and sociologists’ attention shifted
away from the social organization of fishing and its importance in fisheries manage-
ment contexts. Instead, they began focusing on resource management regimes per se.
Although he largely ignores the earlier social science literaturea, geographer David
Symes’s (1999):142 argument that ‘there has been relatively little emphasis on the in-
ternal social structures of the “family firm” and its external linkages or on the socially
and culturally constrained decision making within these important micro-institutions’
certainly holds water. Thus, while kinship is at the core of social organization in fish-
ing communities, our comprehension with regard to its manifestations and, by exten-
sion, processes of social reproduction is dated and rather fragmentary. We know
surprisingly little about more recent forms and dynamics of familial and kinship in-
volvement in the fisheries. It is also unclear whether the preference for a crew com-
posed of kinsmen ‘arises from obligation, necessity or choice’ (Symes and Frangoudes
2001:163), although it usually emanates from ‘a complex relationship of interwoven
strands of economic interest and social obligation within and across the generations’
(Byron 1994:287).
Based upon in-depth historical and anthropological research on the Dutch island of
Texel, I will show how the social dynamic and economic logic of the family firm ope-
rates in practice and what makes it such a profoundly adaptive and resilient
organizational entityb. Texel is a municipality and has approximately 13,800 inhabi-
tants, most of whom reside in one of its seven villages. For two of these villages the
fisheries are particularly important: Oudeschild - where the harbour is situated - and
Oosterend - home to most of the offshore family firms (see Figure 1). Both villages have a
population of between 1,300 and 1,400 people. Currently (June 2013), Texel’s fishing fleet
Figure 1 Map of Texel.
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that are equipped with 2000 hp engines. These capital-intensive vessels operate pulse
trawls in the southern and south-eastern North Sea to catch sole and plaice and associ-
ated flatfish stocks on four- to five-day trips. In addition, there are nine inshore cutters
with up to 300 hp engines. They are mainly used in shrimp and flatfish fishing in the
Wadden Sea and the North Sea’s 12 nm zone. About a hundred fishermen crew the local
fishing fleet, while in addition there are a dozen or so co-owners who have terminated
their active fishing careers.
At face value, there would seem to be considerable continuity in most Texel family
firms in the fisheries. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that there is
much variety as to how succession within firms is arranged and which occupations
male family members choose or end up in during their life cycle. I will illustrate this by
presenting some examples from a local fisher lineage. In family businesses, lineages
often do not develop. There is a popular saying that someone started a firm, his son
brought it to wealth and then the grandson destroyed it. This is not generally the case
with family firms in the Texel fishing industry. Though one should take care not to single
out a successful ‘old’ firm as paradigmatic for the entire local fishing industry (Marcus
2005:618), examples of firms with a long continuous history do exist and they may be in-
structive to learn about the dynamics of success and failure in fisheries family businesses.
In this article, I will focus on the van der Vis fishing lineagec.
Currently, the owner-operators of five Texel vessels share van der Vis as their last
name. The owners of another vessel have recently decommissioned it. They are related
through - partly distant - paternal kinship ties. All of them share Pieter van der Vis,
himself a fifth-generation van der Vis fisherman who was born in 1801, as their ancestor.
For over two centuries, many van der Vis agnates have been active in the local fishing in-
dustry and some of them rose to positions of prominence economically and also as board
members of fisheries organizations and local institutions. The family is deeply rooted in
the village of Oosterend and environs and its male members belong to a Protestant de-
nomination, the Dutch Reformed Church. Their marriages have predominantly been
locally and religiously endogamous, with settlement generally being virilocal: a van der
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and they settled in the husband’s village upon marriage. In the past, a fisherman’s wife
often was a fisherman’s daughter. In addition to agnatic consanguinity, in some cases
ties of affinity have, therefore, also been important in the continuity of family firms
because intermarriage between fisher families was until recently rather common. So
much so, that there were - and are - complex inter-linkages between several of the
island’s - and particularly Oosterend’s - fisher families. However, so as not to tremen-
dously complicate things, I will mainly focus on consanguineous ties through the
descending male line.
A Texel fisher folk lineage
The involvement of the van der Vis family in the Texel fishing industry dates back to
the end of the seventeenth century (see Figure 2). Meeuwis van der Vis, an inland
bargeman, hailed from a mainland village and married a Texel woman in 1693. The
couple settled on the island that same year. She gave birth to two sons. Little is known
about Meeuwis, but given his background he most likely picked up a maritime occupa-
tion after moving to Texel, in all probability making him the progenitor of the van der
Vis fishing lineage. We know for certain that his youngest son Willem was a fisherman.
Only one of Willem’s sons, Pieter, survived childhood and followed in his father’s foot-
steps. Pieter married Hiltje Brouwer, who in 1767 gave birth to a son, Willem, her only
child. As tradition required, sons and daughters were named after their grandparents
and other patrilineal or matrilineal relatives. If children died young, their names were
passed on to children born after them. These naming practices led to a repetition of
names across several generations, first-born cross-cousins usually receiving the same
first names. To avoid confusion, people were nicknamed or referred to by the patro-
nymic name (male ascendant line). Thus, Willem would be known as ‘Willem of
Pieter’ or ‘Willem Pzn’, ‘Pzn’ being an abbreviation of ‘Pieter’s son’.
Willem Pzn in 1792 married Engeltje Saris, who descended from a locally prominent
family of aldermen and oyster skippers. They had two sons and five daughters – three
of whom died in infancy. The sons, Jan and Pieter, became fishermen. Ideal-typically,
occupational inheritance in the agnatic descending line was common. It depended on
having male offspring, of course. Nuclear families were generally quite large, but poor
health conditions led to high infant mortality. This made father-to-son succession a
contingent factor, which depended on boys surviving childhood. Young boys not even
in their teens joined their fathers aboard, usually got paid nothing or only some spending
money, received an on-the-job training and gradually learned the ropes of the occupation.
Having a son could thus save on money that otherwise had to be spent on paying a non-
related deckhand. Consequently, Jan and Pieter joined their father as young boys, savingFigure 2 Seven generations of van der Vis fishermen.
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for their labour. The money thus saved was earmarked to redeem debts and invest what
was subsequently available. In matrimony, Jan and Pieter turned independent. For four
generations, there had been no more than two van der Vis sons in the male descending
line. But between them, Jan and Pieter had nine boys. It was when they reached maturity
that the van der Vis fishing lineage became firmly established in Texel’s fishing industry.
Jan Wzn had three sons with his first wife and after she died another two with his
second wife. All of Jan’s five boys had to crew at an early age. Depending on the stage
of the family cycle, family members crewed the boats and eventually made way for
younger siblings so that a boat would not be overstaffed. The older ones would become
independent or crew for another relative if that was feasible. Even though Jan’s sons
augmented the household budget, in the mid-1840s he was one of Oosterend’s poorest
skipper-owners, earning an annual income of no more than 200 guilders in 1846. At the
time, oyster fishing was in a grave crisis. Despite the prospect of poverty, all of Jan’s sons
continued fishing either for a number of years or as a lifelong career. The island economy
offered few alternatives. In 1850, Jan’s vessel broke adrift and was lost. His youngest sons
began hand-picking mussels and sold them for fifteen cents per bucket to villagers and
farmers. His spouse started peddling rolls and cakes on the island. Through these petty
jobs, charity, and a loan, the family collected just enough money to buy another second-
hand boat, the smallest sailing vessel of the local fishing fleet. It would not be the last time
that misfortune assailed Jan’s family. Seven years later, this substitute boat was also nearly
shipwrecked. Repairs were expensive.
Jan’s brother Pieter Wzn established his own household in 1825 when he married an oyster
skipper’s daughter who was pregnant with their first child. The couple settled in the hamlet
of Oost and Pieter bought a second-hand vessel to earn a living. His wife gave birth to
thirteen children, several of whom died in infancy. In addition to bringing up the kids and
managing the household, she ran a petty shop and did odd jobs - including heating the foot-
stoves in church, which earned her a few extra cents. Nonetheless, the household was as
poor as Jan’s. The sons - Willem, Simon, Biem and Pieter - came aboard their father’s vessel
by age nine, the usual age for boys to enter a fishing career in the first half of the nineteenth
century. When Willem joined his father in 1835, oyster fishing was still thriving. It was the
Oosterend fisher folk’s mainstay. But by the time Simon was old enough to assume the third
man position twelve years later, it was in serious decline as oyster stocks were depleted (see
van Ginkel 1996a). All members of the household subsequently took on any kind of work to
weather the depression. In many cases, fishermen’s spouses for example ran a small shop,
did the laundry for well-to-do families, sewed clothes or worked as cleaning ladies. Young
girls would usually also contribute to a household’s revenues by running errands or working
as maidservants. As family firms were units of production and units of consumption, econo-
mizing on household expenditures was an oft-used strategy to cope with adverse times.
Although they were very poor, with five and four sons, respectively, Jan and Pieter
availed of considerable ‘agnatic capital’. Yet this in itself was insufficient to ensure family
firm continuity in the long run. Not a single member of Jan Wzn’s agnatic offspring is cur-
rently working in the fisheries. All of today’s van der Vis owner-operators are descendants
of Pieter Wzn, who is their (great)-great-grandfather. Jan’s sons became independent in
the 1860s, but some of them quit fishing rather quickly and migrated to the mainland or to
the island’s main town of Den Burg. There, they switched to land-based jobs. Others shared
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charity to enable them to acquire other vessels. All of Jan’s grandsons exited the fishing in-
dustry well before the advent of the Second World War. For very few of his sons it had pro-
vided a lifelong occupational career. In one instance, we avail of considerable detail because
the person in question, Jan’s son Frederik (1842–1925), wrote a life history.
Frederik joined his father and his stepbrother Dirk Jzn as an apprentice deckhand
when he was eleven years old. They targeted eel and oysters in the fall and winter, gathered
cockle shells in the spring and harvested eelgrass in the summer season. The revenues
from eelgrass mowing were used to get through the lean winter season. With a crew of
only three needed, Willem Jzn and Pieter Jzn started crewing for other skippers. In
1858, Dirk and Frederik narrowly escaped from being shipwrecked more than once.
Damages to their boat were substantial and repairs cost 300 guilders, which consti-
tuted a veritable fortune at that time. Two years later, Dirk married and turned inde-
pendent. Pieter thereupon started crewing on the family boat again with his youngest
stepbrother, Simon. Pieter’s former skipper hired Frederik, then 18, as a deckhand for
a fixed annual wage of 130 guilders and free board. Two years later, Frederik began
working for another owner-operator, Jan Wuis, who would become his brother-in-law:
he married Frederik’s sister Elisabeth.
When his stepbrother Pieter turned independent, Frederik began skippering the fam-
ily boat with his brother Simon as a deckhand. They still resided in the parental home,
taking care of their elderly parents. Father Jan passed away in 1865. Late that year,
Frederik, Simon, their brother-in-law Jan Wuis and several other Texel fishermen
were involved in illegally salvaging bags of sugar from a shipwrecked brigantine. They
were caught and sentenced to six months incarceration. While in solitary confinement in
their cells in 1867, Frederik and Simon left their mother without an income. She suc-
ceeded in getting her sons out of the Amsterdam jail two months before the end of
their prison terms. The episode turned Frederik into a pious man who scorned worldly
authority.
Once out of prison he picked up fishing again, this time as an independent man.
Deeming his boat to be too small and too old, Frederik in 1869 bought a second-hand
vessel with a loan from a cousin. When Simon got married, Frederik hired a deckhand
for three guilders per week. Hiring and firing was done without much ado: agreements
were valid from Christmas until Christmas the next year, whereupon skipper and deck-
hand were free to part ways again. Frederik’s mother set up a small shop, so that she no
longer depended on Frederik’s money. At long last, like many other Texel fishermen, he
was doing well. The local fishing economy was booming.
In 1872, Frederik married a woman who was thirteen years his senior, 42-year old
Neeltje List. She was a well-to-do farmer’s widow with two sons and three daughters.
They bought a house and with her financial assistance, Frederik in 1873 commissioned
a new and fully equipped 48-feet flat-bottomed fishing boat for 2,300 guilders. He
named it ‘De Nieuwe Hoop’ (The New Hope). Frederik skippered and his teenager
stepsons Maarten and Jacob Bas crewed the boat. Although he was now a rather suc-
cessful fisherman, on many occasions in his career Frederik had narrow escapes and
when he began suffering from a persistent pneumonia he was keen on changing jobs.
At age 33, he bought a second-hand barge for 1,500 guilders and turned into a freight
skipper, temporarily exiting the fisheries. Among many other things, he shipped
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return freight to the island. Despite being dependent on traders who commissioned
transportation of goods, Frederik liked his new metier. In 1882, he placed an order for
a new barge which he purchased for 4,435 guilders, again partly with Neeltje’s money.
When she died two years later, Frederik had to pay his stepchildren their share of the
vessel’s assessed value. He and his stepson Jacob Bas became the barge’s part-owners.
But Frederik wished to expand his activities and with six fellow fishermen, he in 1888
established a shrimp-processing firm in the mainland town of Den Helder. A year later,
he took over the firm with Jacob. In 1891, they sold it because most fishermen began
boiling and salting the crustaceans themselves. In the same year, Frederik remarried a
widow with three children, Jannetje Bakker. Jannetje started running a shop from their
home. She and Frederik had a son, Jan Jacob (1892-1960), and a daughter. Frederik
was a respected villager by now and in 1892 was asked to become an elder of Oosterend’s
Dutch Reformed Church, an honourable position he held for the maximum term of
eight years. Soon after his wedding, Frederik specialised as a barge skipper again,
leaving the fishing industry altogether. Until his death in 1925, he, his wife and Jan
Jacob - who started as a deckhand on the barge by age ten - earned a modest
livelihood.
The case history shows that nineteenth-century crew composition could be rather
dynamic. Father-son(s) or all-brother crews were preferred but not necessarily the
rule, and switching careers temporarily or permanently was not at all exceptional.
Crew configurations therefore varied and even considerable agnatic capital did not
guarantee becoming a successful firm, as the ventures of Jan’s sons - including Frederik -
showed.
Pieter Wzn’s offspring
The fishing history of the lineage of Jan’s brother Pieter Wzn took quite another turn.
Pieter Wzn skippered a boat until his death in 1866. Although his wife became the ves-
sel’s owner, her deceased husband left her in dire straits. Until she passed away in 1884,
she depended on her sons for a living. By that time, they were married with children.
While most of Pieter’s descendants were also confronted with serious setbacks, two of
them, Willem Pzn and Biem Pzn, had meanwhile become rather successful fishermen.
Without going into the genealogical details, it is clear that their agnatic capital proved
an important asset: Willem had four sons who were born in the 1860s and survived
childhood, Biem had three. His boys were born in the 1870s. It is important to remem-
ber, however, that sons were a precondition for firm continuity and possibly expansion,
but as we have seen they did not necessarily lead to a firm’s success.
Biem was a petty shellfish fisherman, toiling to eke out a living with his flat-bottomed
sailing vessel. He also harvested eelgrass in the summer. Initially, he and his nuclear
family lived a hand-to-mouth existence. His wife for some time ran a small shop, but as
the number of debtors increased, Biem begged her to forsake the unprofitable business.
She then went out working for thirty cents a week. Eventually, Biem – nicknamed
‘Biem-with-the-big-hands’ – was not doing bad. In due course, he would even own two
boats. As one of the island’s foremost fishermen, he was on the board of several local
fishermen’s organizationsd. His boys joined him as crewmembers when the local fishing
industry was thriving. But the period of boom was short-lived and from the mid-1890s
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fishermen. In offshore fishing, tragedy was always lurking. Pieter van der Vis Wzn –
‘Big Piet’, a son of Biem’s brother Willem Pzn – was one of nine Texel fishermen who
drowned when a sudden storm burst on the local fishing fleet in late March 1896.
Three vessels were lost, four others ran aground. Pieter’s mortal remains washed ashore
after eighty days. His wife’s father also died in the disaster, which plunged the island’s
fishing communities in deep sorrow. Such perils may have deterred some men from en-
tering the occupation, but as long as it provided employment and an income, fishing
remained an economic necessity. However, proceeds from fishing began lagging behind
expectations and many fishermen and their sons opted for an onshore job. This also
applied to a number of the van der Vis brothers and patrilateral cross-cousins. For in-
stance, Biem’s eldest son began working as an independent barge skipper, maintaining a
regular service between Texel and a mainland town, and his youngest son Jan also left the
fishing industry, albeit temporarily. In 1899, he migrated to a mainland city and began
working as a wage-laboured barge skipper. But seven years later he returned to Texel and
started fishing again with his father and his brother Toon.
The brothers Toon and Jan would ultimately belong to the island’s fishing elite. Their
father Biem retired in 1921 at the age of 77. It was a transition period. Sails made way
for engines, steel began replacing wood (see Figure 3). Toon and Jan entertained thoughts
of motorizing the boat, but their parents did not want to be indebted all over again. They
asked Toon and Jan to acquire the firm, while they made do with an old age allowance of
five guilders per week. Toon and Jan had a 26 hp auxiliary engine installed in their
wooden-hulled sailing boat. Engine-powered vessels implied that fewer fishing days were
lost, for example due to a lack of wind. Jan’s children did odd jobs and contributed their
savings - amounting to almost a hundred guilders - to enable their father and uncle to
buy the engine. At Christmas later that year, Jan gave each of his five kids a hundred
guilders in gratitude: because of the engine, it had been a successful year. Toon and
Jan gained a reputation of being outstanding skippers. They were on top of newFigure 3 Newly built cutter of a van der Vis firm, 1920s (photograph collection author).
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But they remained keenly aware of the fact that their parents and grandparents had expe-
rienced poverty and hardship. They had listened to their stories and in turn passed these
on to their children and their children’s children.
Toon and Jan had three and two sons, respectively. When they were old enough, they
joined the crew. This implied that more hands were available than was required. The broth-
ers Toon and Jan thereupon decided to go separate ways in 1928. They had been earning
well, and after the financial settlement Jan - whose nickname was ‘the Old Russian’ - pur-
chased a new steel-hulled flat-bottomed boat with a 45 hp engine. Toon continued opera-
ting the old vessel with his sons, but within two years they bought a new cutter with a
100 hp engine that cost 12,000 guilders. The family firm was highly successful, and already
in 1936 a new steel-hulled cutter was launched, this time equipped with a 150 hp engine.
Jan also adopted an expansive strategy. In 1930, he bought a new steel-hulled cutter with a
100 hp engine. Jan was one of the founding fathers of the local fisheries cooperative that
was established in 1931. He also became a deacon and an elder in Oosterend’s Dutch
Reformed Church, and from 1935 to 1939 he served as councillor for a confessional
political party. He was a deeply religious man, accepting the vicissitudes of fishing.
In 1939 he again bought a new cutter that was equipped with a 150 hp engine and
cost almost 45,000 guilders.
Cutters were comparatively cost-effective and efficient and could be handled by a
relatively small crew. Their owners obtained excellent financial results, but buying a
cutter required a considerable investment. This in turn changed the balance of forces
of production from labour being more important to capital becoming ever more im-
portant, although the local fishing industry’s social organization remained predomin-
antly based on family firms. The economic logic and social dynamic of the family firm
contributed importantly to the Texel fishing fleet’s expansion. Highly significant to this
was an ethic of deferred gratification. Relatives were prepared to cut their own incomes
for some predefined or implicit future goal. With the greater capital outlay needed in
the North Sea cutter fisheries, it was important to obtain the funds needed to buy sea-
worthy boats. Although skipper-owners were usually able to redeem debts, account for
depreciation and still save money to buy new boats, vessel prices were such that they
usually needed to contract higher loans. Using a boat - and often a house too – as col-
lateral, banks would be prepared to provide part of the money, particularly if an owner
had sons. Sometimes, bank loans would not entirely suffice. The fishermen therefore
also had to raise funds through private loans that had to be redeemed. Usually, they
called on relatives whom they knew or believed to be affluent. In order to quickly
redeem such loans, owners and their crewing offspring usually only took a modest pre-
determined sum of cash per week. This would amount to less than a deckhand’s share.
Young unmarried crewing sons of owners would generally receive ‘spending-money’
only. The money thus saved would be remitted to the firm so that debts could be
redeemed quickly, enabling investment in a new boat at some point in future.
This mode of self-restraint and self-exploitation stimulated rapid modernization and
growth. In 1931, Texel’s fishing fleet boasted four steel-hulled cutters with 100 to
150 hp engines: eight years later there were twelve such vessels, four of them owned by
members of the van der Vis lineage. A century earlier, their forebears had still belonged
to the poorest villagers of Oosterend, but this was no longer the case. Although the
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of the Texel fishing fleet. However, the advent of the Second World War brought an
end to an era of prosperity. The German occupiers impounded the best fishing vessels,
including the cutters owned by van der Vis skippers. After the liberation and following
intensive search parties, three of the latter were retrieved. The next generation would
crew these vessels.Family firms in an Era of expansion
Gradual growth of the offshore fleet and the rather rapid decline of the inshore seg-
ment characterized post-war developments in the Texel fishing industry. It was evident
that owner-operators needed to modernize to stay in business. Those who were unable
do so began lagging behind and in most cases were ousted from the fishing industry or
had to muddle through and accept substandard incomes. In the early 1950s, the state
established a committee to look into the matter and introduced special subsidies for
decommissioning and development of the fishing fleet, so that family firms could more
easily obtain external capital for investments. In a letter to a fishery weekly, retired
Texel fisherman Jan van der Vis Bzn (‘the Old Russian’) wrote that expansion and state
support were unnecessary and even undesirable as well as irresponsible. He regarded
the extant fishing fleet sufficiently large. In his view, growing exploitation and increas-
ing competition were not in the fishing industry’s interest. Of course, he implied the
vested interest: newcomers with state-of-the-art equipment would inexorably lead to
fiercer competition. At the time, members of the van der Vis family owned five out of
twelve local offshore vessels (41.6%) and accounted for fourteen out of their sixty-two
crewmembers (22.6%), while several in-laws also crewed with them. Van der Vis fishing
firms had obviously become part of the local fishing elite. Jan van der Vis Bzn’s words
were ignored. Subsidies became available for the modernization of the fisheries, not
because fishermen called for them, but because politicians indulged in economic
nationalism.
In hindsight, however, modernization in offshore fishing was initially rather modest.
By 1960, the Texel fleet boasted sixteen offshore cutters. In many respects, they resem-
bled the ones that dated from the mid-1930s. Generally, engine power had only slightly
increased to between 150 and 250 hp. Otter trawling for flatfish and pair trawling for
herring did not require enormous pulling power. However, with the advent of new
technology, this would change radically as of the early 1960s. It was the beam trawl’s
(re)invention, in particular, that brought about a headlong expansion and innovation of
the fishing fleet, leading to an unmitigated ‘horsepower race’ in the Texel and Dutch
fishing industries. Flatfish catches increased extraordinarily and so did the fishermen’s
incomes. The fisheries thrived. With few restraints and many incentives to invest, as of
the early 1960s the Texel family-owned fishing fleet expanded at a fast pace, both in
number of boats and in engine power. By 1970, there were 28 vessels with over 300 hp
engines. The underlying causes for this unprecedented growth included social and cul-
tural factors, not least the logic and dynamic of the family firm. The owners did not
solely reckon in terms of net losses or profits and future returns on investments or
other economic incentives. Nor were status considerations alone sufficient reason to
desire growth. Social reasons - continuity of the family firm and equal opportunities to
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nalities to expand; rationalities that might deviate from pure business economics.
Despite the ‘Old Russian’s’ reservations, the van der Vis fishermen were very much
involved in the Texel fleet’s modernization. Jan’s own son Biem and particularly Biem’s
three sons were very expansionist indeed. By 1960, they operated two state-of-the-art
vessels. A year later, Biem Jzn retired as an active fisherman at age 56, maintaining his
co-ownership. In 1966, a year before he passed away, he opted out. The value of the
firm’s assets was split five ways: two daughters received their shares and Biem’s three
sons established a partnership. The brothers were eager to reinvest and usually were
the first to avail of Texel’s most powerful beam trawlers. The situation was similar in
the case of the ‘Old Russian’s’ brother Toon’s sons. Toon passed away in 1957, at age
84. The following year, the firm - that operated two vessels - fissioned. Having no suc-
cessors and being unfit to skipper, the youngest son sold his share to his brothers Pieter
Anthonie Tzn and Jan Tzn who then each established an independent firm. Skipper-
owner Pieter Anthonie and his three sons continued operating the TX 37, while Jan
Tzn, whose sons were still too young to crew, became the skipper-owner of the TX 36.
He soon purchased a second vessel, which was crewed by outsiders and skippered by a
son-in-law. His sons came aboard around 1970, and both soon moved on to skipper
the vessels. When he was in his late fifties, Jan Tzn turned a shore captain, taking care
of the firm’s administration and other chores. The situation in other van der Vis fishing
families was very similar, though not all of them were equally successful as Jan’s and
Toon’s offspring.
Relatives working as crewmembers provided an important social asset. Depending on
the stage in the household’s life cycle, a father and son(s) or brothers constituted the
crew’s core. The strength of this preference shows in the fact that in the late 1950s,
about half of Texel’s cutter crews had a core of three or more agnates, often partly sup-
plemented by in-laws. If skipper-owners had male offspring, their sons would often be
impatient to assume their father’s role, work aboard and eventually become skipper-
owners themselves. There was a pervasive sense of the significance of occupational in-
heritance and handing down of fishing traditions, knowledge and zeal. It was every
owner’s dream to have at least one successor to continue the family firm, putting a
strong moral obligation on the male offspring of owner-operators to follow their fa-
ther’s example. Fishing was an important source of identity and an occupation that was
highly valued by those in the industry, something skipper-owners in particular wanted
to pass on to the next generation. Better still was to have more sons and to provide
each of them showing an interest in fishing with a vessel of his own. Obviously, con-
tinuity depended on the social contingency of having at least one son who, in addition,
had to be physically and mentally up to the job. Daughters were - and are - regarded as
unsuitable successors. However, for want of agnatic successors, a son-in-law would
sometimes succeed his father-in-law or become a co-owner. For example, a son and a
son-in-law succeeded Willem van der Vis in 1960. When the son soon after that
decided to sell his share and start a fish retail shop, the son-in-law became the sole
owner of the firm, which was continued by his sons and currently his grandsons.
Thus, one of the driving forces underlying the growth of the Texel (and Dutch) fish-
ing fleet was the fishermen’s desire to become independent and, ideally, to set up each
owner’s son with his own vessel to skipper. When the father retired - often maintaining
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continued the firm and cooperated until their sons joined them aboard ship. There
would sometimes be insufficient positions to accommodate them all. In addition, cous-
ins (FaBroSo) often did not get along regarding fishing matters and other decisions and
wanted to work with their own father on their own vessel. Consequently, schisms of
family firms usually occurred during the stage when two or more brothers each had
sons aboard. Conflict and subsequent fission could also occur if one of the cooperating
brothers felt that he contributed disproportionately to the firm or in case the characters
of siblings or cousins proved incompatible. As a van der Vis owner-operator related:
‘There is bound to be someone who is obstinate and it easily kindles feelings that the
one does more than the other does. You should contribute equally, but a skipper does
less work with his hands, and if his brother is a deckhand and does manual labour, he
might say “you don’t do anything”. The fat would be in the fire then…’ Both centripetal
and centrifugal forces (Faris 1973:93) consequently characterize the family firm. Due to
this dynamic, the Texel fishing fleet expanded, particularly in times of boom, making
family firms even more common. Occupational inheritance and - where several agnates
(or cognates) were co-owners - fission or expansion of family firms meant that the
number of vessels increased. At that time, there were few legal restrictions on accessing
the fishing industry. As in other Dutch fishing communities, the fishing family firm dy-
namic was an important reason for the local fleet’s growth. Continuity of the family
firm was deemed extremely important - for most owners even a raison d’être.
The family firm usually rests on close conjugal cooperation and the fisherman’s wife’s
organizational, economic and emotional contribution to the fishing household is often
crucial for its flexibility, versatility and resilience. The role of women in Texel family
firms was usually considerable. If they had been married in community of property, a
deceased skipper’s widow owned the cutter, but her son(s) usually ran the firm. If she
had no boys or if they were too young to crew, she might employ a hired skipper and
deckhands. For example, the widow of a van der Vis owner-operator who suddenly died
from a heart attack at a young age continued the firm and had the relatively new cutter
skippered by an unrelated deckhand until her eldest son could take over the helm. As
in this case, most couples were married on equal terms, so that the wife in theory
owned half her husband’s property. Some women played an important part in running
the financial side of the firm, but with very few exceptions they did not work aboard shipe.
Underlying the division of tasks are cultural and symbolic constructions and constrictions.
Although they were mostly indirectly involved in the fishing industry, the women’s - and
particularly the skipper-owners’ wives’ - supportive role allowed the men to go out to sea
and earn a living. In their role of rearing the children, mothers were also important for
ingraining the values boys needed at sea. They were just as keen as their fathers were to
prepare them for their future role in the firm, as occupational inheritance in skipper-
owner families usually was a matter of course. Ideally, skipper-owner’s sons would be
skipper-owners themselves in future. Living economically and being thrifty often made ex-
pansive growth possible. Women had a significant part to play in accomplishing this goal.
Their spending patterns reinforced the firm’s financial strength and facilitated redeeming
debts and paying interest on loans in time. By making do with a rather modest weekly al-
lowance for running the household, she enabled her husband to reinvest or to keep up
with his brother(s) in purchasing his share in the firm.
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women - facilitated the expansion of production units, ultimately leading to processes
of fission. Because of family involvement in fishing firms, ownership was rather widely
distributed in the occupational community of fishermen. From 1960 until 1971, between
thirty and forty per cent of the Texel fishermen co-owned a vessel. The vast majority of
Texel owner-operated family firms had a single fishing boat. In some cases, fisher families
with several agnatic kinsmen who could be on a crew owned more than one vessel. For
example, in 1969, four firms - including two van der Vis firms - owned two cutters and
one firm owned three. Newcomers from non-fishing lineages also contributed consider-
ably to the local offshore fishing fleet’s growth. In the 1960s, especially, several deckhands
aspired to become independent and bought their own vessels. In many cases, the new-
comers also followed the ‘family logic’ and worked with agnatic kin - usually a father and
son(s) or two or more brothers. In the first stage of such firms, they bought a second-
hand cutter, working their way up until they were able to order a new vessel. Of at least
thirteen newcomers in the offshore segment between 1961 and 1969, two firms began
with a father and sons as co-owners, and three started with two or three brothers as co-
owners. As soon as they consolidated their firms, the family dynamic of occupational in-
heritance applied. The father would leave at a certain stage, the brothers would cooperate
until their sons entered the crew and the firm would split. Among the newcomers were
two firms that began as a partnership between two former crewmembers. These were not
successful - the firms were dissolved after only a few years. Two former partners set up
new firms with siblings, while the other two went it alone. Two brothers-in-law set up an-
other firm, but as they disagreed on almost everything and could not get along, they
quickly went their separate ways, each establishing a firm of his own. Both firms only
existed for a few years. Although it would be too simplistic to say that family involvement
alone determined success, it certainly contributed to it.
Family firms under New management regimes
Family firms remained important following the introduction of quota regimes in the
1970s and a co-management regime coupled with an Individual Transferable Quota
(ITQ) system in the 1990s. Many owner-operators accumulated rights, leading to a
concentration of quota entitlements in fewer hands. It has become virtually impossible
for newcomers to enter the fishing industry. Crew loyalty diminished, since investments
in quotas meant lower percentages in the share system of remuneration. This in turn
led to declining interest in becoming a fisherman, while at the same time it became
more difficult to maintain family firms. Starting a firm from scratch is nearly impos-
sible, since outsiders cannot obtain a licence and quotas unless they buy a firm. The
value of entitlements makes the costs prohibitively high. Therefore, aspiring newcomers
are effectively barred from entry to the fishing industry, as access boundaries prove to
be insuperable. There are even considerable problems with occupational succession
within family firms. Young fishermen, especially, experience difficulties, while older
slipper skippers use their entitlements as an old-age pension.
The earlier common pattern of fissions of family firms has now become virtually im-
possible. Dividing entitlements would jeopardize maintaining an economically viable
firm. The value of quotas usually exceeds the vessel’s value. It used to be possible to be-
queath these allowances, but when tax inspectors started to take into account their
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retiring co-owner transferred rights to his agnates. Even if a brother or another co-
owning relative was prepared to sell his share at a reasonable price, the tax collector
still demanded the percentage of the estimated value, not the percentage of the actual
price paid. Consequently, it became increasingly difficult to continue a family firm.
Since the sense of continuity linking generations of fishermen is so pervasive, this situ-
ation has created exasperation, as the traditional pattern of succession and inheritance
is no longer a matter of course. Many owner-operators have changed the juridical form
of their firms into limited liability companies, in order, among other things, to make
succession of ownership easier (Davidse and de Wilde 2001:33). Special tax arrange-
ments have meanwhile made succession from father to son easier.
However, if a co-owning brother who does not have a successor wants to pass on tan-
gible and intangible assets to a nephew, there is still a heavy tax burden. In several in-
stances, it has forced siblings to continue operating a firm together much longer than
they would have done previously. This applies to two van der Vis family firms. For one
of them (firm A), the situation is critical as the co-owning brothers are in their seven-
ties and between them have only one successor. They stopped skippering many years
ago and currently are shore captains. The younger brother’s son is the vessel’s skipper
and has meanwhile become a co-owner. He is the father of two young boys and wants
to continue the firm. Although it is an economically viable enterprise, if the older
brother sells his assets to his younger brother and nephew, this will put a financial bur-
den on them and a fiscal burden on himself. Some potential successors have refrained
from taking on such an encumbrance. For instance, a van der Vis firm - owned by three
brothers - operated two vessels during my first spell of fieldwork. That year (1990), they
decommissioned one boat. The two eldest brothers coped with health problems, and
had by then already retired and turned into ‘shore captains’. They maintained their co-
ownership and shared in the firm’s profits. The youngest brother skippered, but had no
sons. Between the brothers, there was only one male successor. He was on the crew,
but expressed a strong disinterest in becoming co-owner. Although he had attended
Fishery School, he had no intentions of pursuing a lifetime career as a skipper-owner.
He did not want to take on the financial burden of having to buy out his uncles and
continue the firm all by himself. He claimed that there were simply too many responsi-
bilities he alone would have to carry. At some point in the 1990s, he switched to a job
with the island’s oceanographic institute. Several in-laws were also fishermen, but the
three brothers did not consider them to be feasible successors. Although some van der
Vis skipper-owners had in the past secured firm continuity through an in-law connec-
tion, this was not a solution all owners with daughters only preferred, even if this
meant the end of the family business. In 2002, the remaining vessel was decommis-
sioned. The three van der Vis siblings also sold a part of their flatfish landing rights,
renting out the remainder to provide in an income and old-age pension.
Even with two sons who can continue their father’s firm, succession is not a matter
of course, as the following example from the van der Vis lineage shows. Both boys were
interested in becoming fishermen, and upon graduating from Fishery School they
joined the crew in 1999 and 2001, respectively. They made do with a small sum of
‘week money’, expecting to be co-owners in future. But after four years of crewing, the
eldest brother decided that fishing was not his cup of tea. He opined that there were
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talists’ opposition to beam trawling. His younger brother was a fisherman at heart though,
and began skippering the beam trawler while his father remained a shore captain. However,
it proved difficult to make the firm cost-effective and several crewmen left. In 2005 the
father decided to decommission the vessel, but - to the surprise of many local fishermen -
a few years later the firm made a restart with a Euro-cutter that is skippered by the son.
The only van der Vis family firm (firm B) whose continuity seems to be rather secure
was established in 1996. It hived off from firm A (see above). Until 1987, firm A - oper-
ating two and for some time even three beam trawlers - was co-owned by three broth-
ers. That year, the eldest died. His rights and assets were bequeathed on his wife and
four sons, who became co-owners but had to pay tax duties. Remember that by this
time, a vessel and equipment plus entitlements cost many millions of guildersf. All of
the four boys aspired to a fishing career. The financial settlement following the fission
was quite complicated and the tax inspector again demanded a large chunk. This hap-
pened once more when at age 43 the eldest of the four brothers tragically died in a car
accident in 2003. It is now possible to bequeath rights without duties. But heirs who in-
herit quotas face the need to take out loans to buy out those heirs who do not fish.
Whether the sons of the three brothers who own and operate firm B will succeed their
fathers is too early to tell. One of them is meanwhile on the crew, though.
Thus, whereas family firm continuity - and if feasible, expansion - seems to have been
rather uncomplicated for a long time, this has changed dramatically following the intro-
duction of entitlements that proved to represent monetary value. Special precautions
are currently in order. Along with the increasing value of assets in fishing firms, most
spouses have opted for a marriage settlement instead of community of property, as
used to be the custom until the 1980s. If married in community of property, a spouse
is liable to an equal portion of the joint property. If her husband predeceases or di-
vorces her, she can demand her share of the assets tied up in the firm, making it ex-
tremely difficult to continue it (Hoefnagel 1996:68). This is exactly what happened to a
van der Vis skipper, the sole owner of a beam trawler. He and his wife were married in
community of property, but divorced in 2000. She demanded the assets she was legally
entitled to, amounting to millions of guilders. The firm survived this crisis, but the
skipper-owner’s only son did not show any interest in fishing, making it difficult to con-
tinue the firm. The problem was solved when a brother-in-law sold his vessel and in
2008 joined van der Vis as a co-owner, sharing their entitlements and other assets. Had
there been solutions along agnatic lines, this merger would perhaps never have mate-
rialized. With owners currently being rights holders and the fishing industry tightly reg-
ulated, expansion of family firms is a thing of the past. Rather, the trend is contraction
and scaling down of business. If a firm owned more than one vessel, one of them was
decommissioned and the entitlements concentrated on the other. Agnatic (and in-law)
relatives then worked together on the remaining boat. This trend coincides with the
post-war demographic transition towards smaller nuclear families, which generally
makes for a smaller pool of kin and in-laws from among which crewmembers can be
recruited. Nonetheless, few Texel beam trawlers do not have any (co-owning) relatives
at all aboardg. But under the current system of individual transferable entitlements, the
market logic seems to start prevailing over the economic logic of the family firm. Ex-
panded reproduction is a thing of the past and has been replaced by simple reproduction.
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On the island of Texel, kin and familial participation in fishing has been a common
pattern for many decades. Some prominent family firms can even trace their roots back
to the 17th century. However, the current involvement of kinsfolk in fishing crews
should not be regarded as a relic of an ancient mode of production (see also Löfgren
1972; Byron 1986; Menzies 1993, 2003). Newcomers to the 1960s and 1970s local fishing
arena were generally more successful if they worked with agnatic relatives, suggesting that
the family firm is not an archaic form of social organization, but a well-adapted institution
in the days of high capitalism - at least in the fisheries. Rules of inheritance insufficiently
explain the preference for relatives: ‘Among kinsmen, membership of the crew is a com-
plex relationship of interwoven strands of economic interest and social obligation within
and across the generations’ (Byron 1994:287). Pooling economic, social, cultural and cogni-
tive resources provides a common fund to cope with risks and to accommodate to shifting
conditions. The family firm is a relatively fluid and flexible unit, which is highly adaptive
under circumstances of uncertainty (Durrenberger and Pálsson 1985:114 ff.). This applies
in times of expansion and in times of contraction, as well. The involvement of kinsmen
and to a lesser extent relatives by marriage provides such firms with unusual resilience and
versatility. ‘The kinship system easily holds labor reserves during an economic downturn’,
remark Doeringer et al. (1986):119. Whereas wage labourers would not accept major salary
cuts in times of depression, ‘kinship and familial solutions to economic insecurity stress job
guarantees and the sharing of work and income among family members’ (ibid.:119).
Co-owning relatives are usually prepared to postpone (returns on) investments, work
longer hours, defer gratification, cut remuneration, adjust household budgets and eat
into their capital in times of duress or to speed up the redemption of debts and inten-
sify investments in times of prosperity. They can do so because the family firm is at the
same time a unit of (re)production, consumption and (re)distribution, providing the
family firm with an adaptability not usually found in company-owned firms that oper-
ate under the capitalist mode of production (also see Apostle et al. 1992:321; Sinclair
1985:18–20). The ‘family firm logic’ also enables accumulating capital that owners re-
invest in the family firm to allow for expansion. Agnatic kinsmen who are co-owners
often accept receiving a fixed sum of money out of the revenues while keeping the rest
of their share in the firm. Therefore, having sons - agnatic capital - makes for an im-
portant socio-economic asset. Furthermore, a pervasive labour ethos where work per-
meates the entire existence of fishing households greatly enhances adaptive
performance. These feats are extremely important in weathering bad times and building
up the financial reserves needed to expand. With a single owner, such shock-absorbing
and hoarding capacity obviously amounted to less than that of multiple owners or pro-
spective owners who were prepared to defer gratification and still work relentlessly, as
was usually the case with relatives. Young sons of skipper-owners were confident that
they would in future receive their share of the patrimony. Based on this trustful expect-
ation, they were content with a weekly allowance instead of a full share of the gross
revenues. For this reason, cooperating with sons or brothers was more attractive than
recruiting unrelated deckhands. Kin provided for the flexibility, versatility and resilience
needed in an industry where uncertainty was rife.
Of course, the cultural ideal of family-firm continuity and expansion could not be
attained by all the local actors in the fishing arena. At the micro-level of the family
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ition of the nuclear family that to a large extent determined the kind of options that
were available and the course of action that could be envisaged. Some skipper-owners
remained unmarried or had no offspring. Others had sons who did not aspire to skip-
pering or were physically or mentally unfit for a fishing career, or only had daughters
who - under the extant gender relations - rarely obtained or desired to obtain a berth
aboard a boat. Yet others had sons or cousins who proved to be incompatible charac-
ters, making it impossible to work together in the confined space of a vessel. Although
the cultural preference for working with agnatic kin is clear in the Texel case and more
generally in the Netherlands, this need not be so everywhere. Byron and Dilley (1989)
report that in Northern Ireland, skippers resist the obligation to recruit kin or close
friends because it is harder to sack them. Furthermore, kin crews may be composed of
changing coalitions (Beukenhorst 1988), while in some cases in-laws are preferred as
crewmembers (Jorion 1982). In general, however, we see that crews composed of a core
of (co-owning) agnatic kin who are sometimes complemented by (usually non-
propertied) in-laws are widespread in Europe.
The predominant goal of (prospective) co-owners of a family firm is to keep the firm
afloat even in the face of formidable and enduring adversities. This is so because the
firm - symbolized by the family boat - is much more than a material vehicle to earn an
income. It is at the same time a source of pride and social and individual identification,
intrinsically a raison d’être. It is for this reason that owner-operators often tenaciously
hang on to continuing the firm so that they can hand it on to the next generation. In
gratitude, a vessel is often named after a father (and sometimes a mother/wife). For in-
stance, in the case of the van der Vis family: TX 3 ‘Biem-Jan’ (a combination of the
name of a brother who died in a car accident and the father’s name); TX 21 ‘Pieter van
Aris’ (father’s name = Pieter, son of Aris); TX 36 ‘Jan van Toon’ (Jan, son of Toon); TX
37 ‘Pieter Anthonie’ (father’s name); TX 43 ‘Biem van der Vis’ (father’s name).
At the same time, however, one of the major weaknesses of family firms is that in cri-
ses they are vulnerable in that all their members face similar problems and hardships
(the ‘all-eggs-in-one-basket syndrome’). Some firms have attempted to cope with this
weakness by diversifying their activities beyond the fishing economy per se, but obtain-
ing incomes from other sectors poses strains on those who earn them. They may
choose to opt away from the fishing business and operate independently. The firm is
particularly vulnerable when the sons of brothers urge their fathers to abandon the firm
and start an independent family firm with them. There is a widespread preference for a
configuration with father and son(s) over brothers with sons (cousins). However, as a
consequence of demographic shifts (smaller nuclear families), the likelihood of being
able to work with first-order agnatic kinsmen (father-son[s], all-brother crews) has de-
clined considerably. It is no longer a matter ‘of course’ that a married couple will pro-
duce sons, as was still the case in the 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, the reproductive
cycle starts later in life than used to be the case. This often implies that co-owners will
skipper or crew longer than previously. In the 1980s and 1990s, many co-owners quit
going to sea before they turned 50. Currently, they usually cannot afford to do that any-
more. The range of preferred firm members-cum-crew has consequently widened to in-
clude cousins and in-laws. In addition, several sons of owner-operators - including
members of the van der Vis fishing elite - are reluctant to follow in their father’s (and
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demographic trend works against them, and they face a congeries of restrictions and
uncertainties. Whether occupational inheritance will be dominant in future is therefore
questionable. The continuity of several Texel family fishing firms might even be at stake.
But given their willingness to invest and innovate, the co-owners of the remaining
five van der Vis firms would still seem to be confident about the future. Perhaps against
all odds, they are at the forefront of innovative fuel-reduction technologies in the Dutch
fishing industry, showing no inclination whatsoever to abandon ship. They certainly do
appreciate their way of life, but in addition, it should be emphasized that opting out is
currently not feasible without considerable loss of investments in vessel, equipment
and entitlements. Not only would exiting the fishing industry mean destroying the
patrimony, it would also leave most co-owners heavily indebted. Under the extant
European Union’s fisheries management regime newcomers are effectively barred from
entry and demand for fishing assets is very low indeed. In fact, continuing a family firm
would currently seem to be the only viable way to operate a fishing enterprise.
Endnotes
aIn the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, anthropologists and sociologists connected to the
Memorial University of Newfoundland have done important work in this regard. Sev-
eral of their publications refer to Canada, especially Newfoundland (see, for example,
Firestone 1967; Nemec 1972; Faris 1973; Sinclair 1985). MUN’s Institute of Social and
Economic Research published several monographs and edited volumes on fisheries,
which often dealt with kinship and familial involvement to at least some extent.
bField research was conducted on Texel from December 1989 to March 1991 and
from August 2005 to September 2006. I collected data through archival and literature
research, interviews and participant observation. I had full access to the archives of the
local Fishery Coop, the fishermen’s association, the Texel co-management group and
the local Producer Organization. I held in-depth formal interviews with some fifty men
and twenty-five women and informal conversations with scores of others. I attended
the weekly informal meetings of (retired) owner-operators and several other social
events. I was also frequently present at the quayside on Friday, when the fishing fleet
arrives home from a week’s fishing trip, and on four occasions I joined a crew for a
week. For a comprehensive account, see van Ginkel (2009). Some of my more general
points about Texel family firms also appear in that book. A version in Italian of the
present article appeared as ‘La dinamica sociale e la logica economica delle imprese
familiari nel settore della pesca’ in In mare altrui. Pesca e territorialità in ambito inter-
disciplinare, eds. G. Bulian and S Raicevich, 105-132. Roma: Aracne.
cIt is a common practice in anthropology to use pseudonyms. I have refrained from
doing so. For anyone who would wish to do so, it would be easy to detect the real sur-
name of members of the van der Vis fishing lineage. With regard to the last four or five
decades, I have been less specific about the ‘who is who’ in the van der Vis family.
dOn the dynamic of local fishery organizations, see van Ginkel (1996b).
eIn many places across the globe, there is a gendered division of labour in fishing
(Nadel-Klein and Davis 1988).
fWhen the euro currency was introduced in 2001, the conversion rate was roughly
0,45 eurocents to a guilder.
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tives who crewed. Six of these boats had three crewing relatives and in-laws and one
vessel had four crewing relatives and in-laws. Kin involvement is much stronger if one
considers shore-based co-owners.
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